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NEGLECTED PRINCIPLES IN THE PURCHASE
OF REAL ESTATE BY ONE OF SEVERAL
CO-OWNERS
The extent to which real estate has become the subject of
traffic for gain, in contrast to transactions of many years ago
when real estate was the subject of sale and purchase principally
from the desire to own a home, a farm, or a business site, has
created ambitions so intense that not only is the moral aspect of
a "deal" often overlooked, but fixed principles of law as well.
In fact, some of these principles have been so generally ignored,
that those who are aggrieved by their infraction do not seem
even to suspect, or are not advised, that they have any redress.
One of such principles is involved in the situation where several
persons have a common ownership or interest, and one of them
purchases either an outstanding interest or title, or perhaps the
entire title, to the exclusion of his co6wners, and it is this prin-
ciple which forms the present topic. Purchases such as by a
commissioner in partition, or a judicial officer conducting a sale,
or a guardian of an infant party to an action,' or by an executor,
trustee, or similar officer, of the trust property, and involving
undebatable fiduciary relations, and in which cases the purchase
is held either voidable or absolutely void, 2 will not be included in
this presentation.
PURCHASES BY ONE OF SEVERAL OWNERS.
Sometimes one of several owners in good faith buys in an
outstanding title or the entire title, to the exclusion of his cobwn-
ers, and sometimes one of such owners buys an outstanding title
or the entire title, to squeeze out or "cut off" his co6wners.
We shall discuss the aspect of such a purchase by one of several
co6wners, where title is held by tenants in common, joint tenants,
or in any case where a community of interest exists. While
tenants in common may not stand in a strictly fiduciary relation
'N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1679.
2 See Weintraub v. Siegel, 57 (N. Y.) Misc. Rep. 246, reversing 133
(N. Y.) App. Div. 677, 118 N. Y. Supp. 261; Terwilliger v. Brown, 44
N. Y. 237; and see Archer v. Archer, 164 (N. Y.) App. Div. 81, as to
purchase by executor with power in trust.
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to each other, in that they may deal with each other like other
owners of separate property, their relation is to an extent quasi-
fiduciary, and, as to tenants in common by descent, they occupy
a confidential relation toward each other by operation of law,
as to the joint property, and the same reciprocal duties are
imposed as if a joint trust were created.3 Practically the same
has been said of tenants in common by devise,4 and as our sub-
ject is developed, it will be seen that the doctrine now to be dis-
cussed has been applied in rather liberal measure to other
combined ownerships. A purchase of an outstanding title or
interest in property, by a person sustaining certain relations to
others interested in the same property, will, at the option of the
latter, inure to their benefit. The heirs of one who so purchases
stand in no better position than the purchaser. This rule does
not apply only strictly to tenants in common, or joint tenants,
or others having an equality of interest or estate. The rule is
based on a community of interest in a common title, which cre-
ates such a relation of trust and confidence between the parties
that it would be inequitable to permit one of them to do anything
to the prejudice of the other, in reference to the property so
situated.5 "Community of interest produces a community of
duty, and there is no real difference, on the ground of policy and
justice, whether one co-tenant buys up an outstanding incum-
brance, or an adverse title, to disseise and expel his co-tenant.
It cannot be tolerated, when applied to a common subject, in
which the parties had equal concern, and which created a mutual
obligation, to deal candidly and benevolently with each other,
and to cause no harm to their joint interest."" There may be
lack of complete unanimity in enforcing this doctrine,7 but as
we are now presenting the affirmative of it, we shall follow the
preponderant cases in which it has been applied with fairly firm
insistence.
338 Cyc. 15; Hinters v. Hinters, 114 Mo. 26; Buchanan v. King's
Heirs, 22 Grat. (Va.) 414. Cf. Ryason v. Dunton, 164 Ind. 85, 73 N. E. 74.
'Enyard v. Enyard, igo Pa. 114.
'Rothwell v. Dewees, 67 U. S. 613.
' Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 388, 407. See also Fulton
v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 548.
'Streeter v. Schultz, 45 Hun 4o6, I0 N. Y. St. Rep. 115, aff'd. 127
N. Y. 652, referred to in Allen v. Arkenburgh, 2 (N. Y.) App. Div. 457,
74 N. Y. St. Rep. 327, 37 N. Y. Supp. lO32, aff'd. 158 N. Y. 697, and
explained in Peck v. Peck, IIo N. Y. 74, 17 N. E. 383.
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OTHER INSTANCES OF THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE.
The rule that a purchase by one tenant inures to the benefit
of his co-tenants has been applied to many situations. It has
been applied to a purchase by the husband of a co-tenant,8 to the
wife of a co-tenant, presumably because she had an inchoate
right of dower, and in another case where the land descended to
the husband and children on the death of the wife, it was held
that the husband could not, upon a foreclosure sale, purchase the
entire title to the exclusion of his children.10 And it has been
held that the law not only forbids a person occupying a fiduciary
or quasi-fiduciary position from purchasing, but applies to any
person interested with another in any subject of property.1
"Community of interest in a common title or security implies a
mutual obligation not to impair it. It creates such a relation of
trust and confidence that it is inequitable to permit one of the
parties in interest to do anything to the prejudice of others, and
when one of them obtains superior titles or liens he holds them
in trust for the benefit of all who share in the common title or
security, and who, within a reasonable time after notice of his
purchase, contribute their share of his necessary expenditures."' 2
Even in a case where the court made the concession that it is not
a fraud, either actual or constructive, for a joint owner to pur-
chase at a sheriff's sale to enforce payment of taxes, the rule
was nevertheless applied that the purchase inured to the co6wn-
ers.'3 There are occasional instances where a person, without
authority, assumes the management of property in which others
are beneficially interested. In such case, he becomes in equity
a trustee by construction for their benefit, and during the con-
tinuance of such management is subject to the same rules and
remedies as other constructive trustees, and such constructive
trustee cannot purchase for his own account.1"
The cases are not rare where a widow, dissatisfied either with
the provision made for her in her late husband's will or with her
'Perkits v. Smith., i8 Ky. Law Rep. 509; Rothwell v. Dewees, 67
U. S. 613.
'Beaman v. Beaman, 9o Miss. 762.
Wyatt v. Wyatt, 81 Miss. 219.
Clevients v. Cates, 49 Ark. 242, 245; Richards v. Richards, 31 Pa.
Super. Ct. 509, 513.
'Booker v. Crocker, 132 Fed. 7; McGranighan v. McGranighan, 185
Pa. 340.
'Richards v. Richards, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 509.
'4 Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y. 308, 334, 335.
PRINCIPLES IN CO-OWNERSHIP
dower interest or other distributive share in case of death intes-
tate of the husband, seeks to acquire the real property of the
estate through purchase on friendly foreclosure or other proceed-
ings, to the exclusion of the devisees or heirs. It is interesting,
therefore, to pursue the question whether the rule applies to a
widow having a consummate right of dower in land descending
to heirs. It may be conceded that the rule applies to a mother
of infants whose guardian in socage she is. But the rule seems
to be directed against a person owning an interest in the prop-
erty, irrespective of whether the codwners are infants or adults.
This leads to the question whether a widow, with unassigned
dower, may be said to have an interest in the land descending to
the heirs. In some states, the widow is a tenant in common with
the heirs before assignment of dower.
15 Other cases either hold
or indicate that a widow with unassigned dower is not a tenant
in common with the heirs.1 6 And still others in the same juris-
dications indicate that she is.
1 7  Irrespective of whether she be
tenant in common, where a widow has possession of land under
a consummate right of dower, of which she could enforce
admeasurement, "although this right, while unassigned, did not
give her a legal estate in the land, it is now well settled that it
was a legal interest and constituted property which was capable
in equity of being sold, transferred and mortgaged by the dow-
eress."' 8 "Although the widow's dower seems never to have been
admeasured, her occupation of the premises may be regarded as
putting her practically in the position of a doweress in possession
of the one third of the estate to which she was entitled."
19 So
it may be said that remaindermen and the tenant for life are not
strictly tenants in common, and yet they are regarded as "equit-
able co-tenants." 20 In fact, the rule against purchasing for one's
own benefit has been specifically applied to a doweress.
21 And
5 Woorster v. Hunts Co., 38 Conn. 256. See also Kidwell v. Kidwell,
84 Ind. 224; Centreville Co. v. Jarret, 4 Ind. 213; Grolski v. Kostuski,
179 Ill. 177, 53 N. E. 720, 7o Am. St. Rep. 98; McDougal v. Bradford,
So Tex. 558; Freeman on Co-Tenancy, 2d ed. § io8.
' Jackson v. O'Donaghy, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 246; McClanahan v. Porter,
io Mo. 746; Barton v. Reynolds, 81 (N. Y.) Misc. Rep. 15.
"' See Knolls v. Barnhart, 71 N. Y. 474; Bover v. East, i6i N. Y. 58o,
56 N. E. 114, 76 Am. St Rep. 29o.
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shipman, 11g N. Y. 324, 330, 331, 24 N. E. 177.
'Arthur v. Arthur, 76 (N. Y.) App. Div. 330.
" Burhands v. Van Zandt, 7 N. Y. 523.
Enyard v. Enyard, igo Pa. 114. See also Montague v. Selb, io6
Ili 49.
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it would seem that the question of infancy, guardianship, or blood
relationship, has nothing to do with the situation,22 and yet it
is not to be denied that some cases probably turn on the point
as to the statutory provision in regard to the nature of dower,
that is, whether the statute grants an estate to the widow, or
merely a right of action to enforce her dower, and also whether,
in either case, she was in possesesion, or at least in legal posses-
sion, of the property at the time of her attempted exclusive pur-
chase.
RIGHTS OF COWNER IN PURCHASE BY ONE OWNER.
Such person so purchasing holds for the benefit of those inter-
ested in the property with him, such co6wners being bound,
however, tc'contribute their respective proportions of the con-
sideration paid for the outstanding title or incumbrance, and the
cobwners are not barred until after notice of the adverse claim,
while the burden of proof is on the one assuming to purchase to
the exclusion of his co~wners.23  It should be noticed that
whereas in the case of a purchase by a trustee, executor,
guardian, etc., the sale is either void or voidable, in the case of a
purchase such as is now being discussed, while there may be
some similarity, yet the purchase is said to inure to the benefit of
the co6wners. They may elect to claim the benefit of the pur-
chase or refrain from so electing, or even lose the privilege of
electing.2 4 In Buchanan v. King's Heirs,2 5 the general principles
applicable to such cases are well set forth. It is there said that a
joint tenant, or tenant in common, cannot purchase an outstand-
ing title, for his own benefit, to the exclusion of his co-tenants;
that the co-tenant may, within a reasonable time, make his elec-
tion to claim the benefit, and to contribute to the expense incurred
in the purchase of such title; that if he unreasonably delays
until there is some change of circumstance he will be held to have
abandoned the benefit arising from the purchase; but before
such co-tenant can be held to have abandoned his claim, it must
'In Knolls v. Barnhart, 71 N. Y. 474, while the court referred to the
widow as being the guardian in socage of her minor children, it was
coupled with the statement that she was also the doweress, and the case
shows that the question of infancy was not the controlling factor.
'Buchanan v. King's Heirs, 22 Grat. (Va.) 414; Booker v. Crocker,
132 Fed. 7; McGranighan v. McGranighan, 185 Pa. 340; Richards v.
Richards, supra; Hinters v. Hinters, 114 Mo. 25.
'4 Ryason v. Dunton, 164 Ind. 85.
2522 Grat. (Va.) 414.
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appear not only that he has been apprised of the purchase, but
of the claim set up by his co-tenant, and until then he may assume
that the acquisition was made in support of the common title, and
the burden of proof is upon the purchasing tenant to show that
his co-tenant had notice of the purchase and of the exclusive
claim asserted by him. Though one tenant takes the whole pro-
fits, or records the deed by which he assumed to purchase as
against his co-tenants, such acts are said not to amount to notice
that the purchasing tenant claims to have ousted his co-tenant.
In another case it was said that the duty to discharge incum-
brances rested upon all and payment by one is presumed to have
been on behalf of all, and that the interest of all in the property
remains notwithstanding the purchase of the legal title by one,
and the amount necessary for the preservation of the property
is chargeable against it and may be enforced in an equitable pro-
ceeding.2" And if one tenant may not buy in an outstanding
title, much less may he buy in a title that cuts off altogether the
title under which he and his co-tenants hold.
2 7
PURCHASES AT PUBLIC SALES.
The Supreme Court of the United States while recognizing the
principle that there is such a community of interest between those
who hold a common title as to forbid one such co-tenant from
acquiring any benefit from the acquisition of an outstanding
superior title, and that a court of equity upon timely application
will convert such a purchasing tenant into a trustee for the com-
mon benefit, declined to extend the doctrine to purchases at bona
fide public sales, saying: "But it is plain that the principle which
turns a co-tenant into a trustee who buys for himself a hostile
outstanding title, can have no proper application to a public sale
of the common property, either under legal process or a power
in a trust deed. In such a situation, the sale not being in any
wise the result of collusion nor subject to the control of such a
bidder, he is as free, all deceit and fraud out of the way, as any
one of the general public."28 Other cases apply the doctrine even
to public sales.29 But it is frequently the case that the purchasing
"Richards v. Richards, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 509, 513.
'Swineburne v. Swineburne, 28 N. Y. 568.
'Starkweather v. Jenner, 216 U. S. 524.
"See Ryason v. Dunton, supra; Ladd v. Kuhn, 27 Ind. App. 535;
Beaman v. Beaman, go Miss. 762; Wyatt v. Wyatt, 81 Miss. 219; Knolls
vt. Barnhart, 71 N. Y. 474; Dec. Dig., Vol. 19, p. 148; Cent. Dig., Vol.
45, col. 2675.
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tenant designs to bring about a public sale under foreclosure or
otherwise, for the very purpose of bidding in the property for
his own benefit, and in such cases the principle would undoubtedly
apply.30 Judgments and decrees for the sale of real property
usually contain a provision granting formal leave to purchase to
the parties to the action. Such leave seems to be of doubtful
effect as to equities which may exist between the parties. It has
been said that where the rights and equities of a plaintiff, as
between him and his trustees, are in no form or manner before
the court, or involved in the action, it is not "the purpose of the
ordinary provision allowing any party to the action to purchase
to affect equities which may exist between the purchaser and any
other person for whose benefit the purchase may be deemed to .
have been made. Such a provision in foreclosure cases is usually
inserted for the purpose of removing any doubt as to the right
of the complainant, who conducts the suit and the sale, to become
the purchaser. If the purchaser, though a party to the action,
is acting in a fiduciary capacity arising outside of the relation
of mortgagor and mortgagee, his liability to his cestui que trust
cannot be affected by such a provision, nor by the order confirm-
ing the sale."3' In some cases, as under the practice in parti-
tion actions in some states, the sale is first reported to the court,
then confirmed, and a conveyance is then authorized, so that the
court knows who the purchaser is before the sale is confirmed,
and it may be argued that such sale is made and confirmed with
full knowledge by the court as to the identity and situation of
the purchaser.32 "But where the trustee has an interest to pro-
tect by bidding at the sale of the trust property, and he makes
special application to the court for permission to bid, which, upon
the hearing of all the parties interested is granted by the court,
then he can make a purchase which is valid and binding upon




'See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 131 N. Y. IOI, 29 N. E. 13; Ream v.
Robinson, 128 Mich. 92; Collins v. Collins, 36 N. Y. St. Rep. 591,
affirmed 131 N. Y. 648, 3o N. E. 863.
"Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 548; Scholle v. Scholle, ioi N. Y. 167,
4 N. E. 334; Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y. 308, 327.
'See Corbin v. Baker, 167 N. Y. 128, 6o N. E. 332.
Scholle v. Scholle, zoi N. Y. 167, 4 N. E. 334, and authorities there
cited.
